

Transcript
World Trade Center Plenary Session 1/22/02

Port Authority Police Department
Chief Joseph Morris

Good afternoon... I have no slide presentation. What I'll be telling you, I'll give you a little history of the Port Authority, the buildings, and my perspective of responding to the scene, and also my reflections on the 1993 bombing, and what it had possibly done to the minds of the Port Authority police that had responded to the scene. And I'll go into the response and recovery aspect of it. For those who don't know, the Port Authority of New York-New Jersey is a bi-state agency. Created 80 yrs ago, the first one in the country, and we're responsible for all the crossings between New York and New Jersey. Our police force has police powers in both states, making us unique, and further making us unique, at the airports we are the police and also the crash-fire-rescue, at Newark, LaGuardia and Kennedy, so we're trained as firefighters and the police. Also, with the Trade Center, any police officer that was assigned there had to have structural training.

The Port Authority, in late 60s, was charged to build the World Trade Center as part of an agreement between the two states. The Port Authority also took over the PATH trains as part of that. We designed the buildings, we built the buildings, we operated the buildings, we policed the buildings, and the buildings in April of last year were leased as the result of a bidding process, but we're still the owners of the property. The Port Authority, as I said, have the three major airports, Teterboro Airport, the Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland Tunnel, the George Washington Bridge, the Staten Island bridges, Port Newark, Port Elizabeth, and the Brooklyn Piers. The PATH trains, which run from Newark out to the World Trade Center and also into midtown Manhattan at 33rd Street, and the famous thing everybody knows, they call it the Port Authority, the bus terminal located in midtown Manhattan.

In 1993 we had the bombing in February. The best way I can describe it, I was a lieutenant at the time, I responded from our headquarters, which was at Journal Square, in Jersey City, right across the river. I was there probably within 20 minutes; I went over with the Chief of Patrol. The one thing I learned that day, through the course of the day, he said "Joe, what we have here is a tidal wave, that's the best way to put it. And our job is not to get drowned by it, because after it passes we'll have a lot of work to do."

That was something that struck my mind as I was responding on the morning of September 11. On September 11, I was sitting in my office at LaGuardia Airport, when the world changed. I was sitting with my administrator and my interior designer, discussing what kind of conference chairs we should be getting, and I was saying that you can't get normal thin ones, because we wear guns and we get wide bodies as we get older and go up the command. Then somebody yells out, "the World Trade Center has been hit by an airplane!" I turned on the television and saw the images, and yelled out to my executive officer, "we're mobilizing, get me everybody that doesn't need to be here, we'll meet out by the garage." Again, we are trained as crash-fire-rescue at the airport,

so each one of us has bunker gear to respond to an air crash, and our specialty is to put the fire and rescue people in the 2-3 minute span until the fire department comes, and it becomes a structural fire. So everyone responding had their bunker gear. And this happened at every single command. We had people respond from headquarters, including the director of public safety, chief of professional standards, the commanding officer of Kennedy Airport who was there at a meeting responded, headquarter staff responded. We had the police academy, which was located at the Tech Center in Jersey City, just outside the Holland Tunnel, respond with 8 or 9 people, including the commanding officer and the executive officer, and sergeants.

We had the PATH command respond, and at PATH, that's where our emergency personnel worked out of, so from that command alone, 18 people responded, we responded from the three airports, the bus terminal, they literally commandeered a bus, and drove down, PATH people also that were in midtown commandeered cabs and responded down, so you had a whole array. Before both buildings collapsed, we had 200 police officers in the location. First off, we had the police command at the Tower Command, that's a 42-man command, and during that morning, we had approximately nine people working. Also at the Trade Center, when you're operating it, you're part of a larger security and fire response. You had the contracted security guards, the Port Authority Operations people that ran the operations every day, of the plant. And in the building, you had command centers set up. You had the police desk. Down in the B2 level we had a command center set up. On the main concourse of both buildings you had a fire command area where people would respond to, and up on the 44th floor and 78th floor where people respond to. All those locations were responded to and they all took action to evacuate people. Talking to Port Authority people I've known over the years, from past assignments, I was with the labor division so I knew people in the law department, and also human resources, and from the 1993 experience, once that plane hit, they left. Just the lack of Port Authority employees, we lost 37 in certain areas, we believe the doors, they weren't able to escape into the hallways to get down the fire exits. So we had everybody responding to the buildings.

What struck me when I think back was on the BQE, you had a full panorama of both buildings fully cooking, that's the best way I can describe it, fully cooking, and I realized that the buildings were no longer our friends. In 1993 it took the bombing, and what little damage, you know you had damage in the concrete where the parking levels were collapsed, but the main structural steel, there was only one piece was blown out. The building almost absorbed the motion, so that the initial people responding to the first plane thought the building was their friend, they trusted the building. I look back now and had the luxury of seeing the panorama and saying, "that building's not our friend."

What happened, we immediately called into the desk, I found out that the airports had been closed, the tunnels and bridges had been closed, talking to our central desk over the radio, and that we had very little communications with the building. We also communicated amongst ourselves when we went to the BQE, Williamsburg Bridge, worked our way downtown, traffic wasn't bad, we were there, I would say, someplace around, we left when the first one was struck, maybe ten minutes later, so we were there

before the first one came down, maybe six to seven minutes and we all stayed, we were on the north side of the complex, we parked on Barclay Street and West Broadway and we all stayed away from Vesey Street, because as the chief pointed out, people were jumping out of the buildings, and you also had pieces of the plane and the buildings coming down, which were killing people. We stayed on Barclay Street because that gave us a block of buildings to protect us. We found the other units that responded from Newark Airport and the other commands met where our command post located itself, just north of the intersection of Vesey and West, facing southbound on West Street, and by fortune, when you talk to the driver of the command bus that responded from New Jersey, was that he couldn't get closer to the building.

So we all met there, there were about 45 of us at that location, we knew we had people south, where the chief came in, Liberty and West area, and decisions were made, we're not going into that buildings right away. Break up into groups of three or four, with a supervisor, get your bunker gear on, we need to get a plan. I was lucky enough to have with me, I knew the complex would mean I had command over it. But I also had a Lieutenant with me who had spend nine years in the building complex as a police officer and as a sergeant, and we went down to the intersection of West and Vesey Streets, looking for the best way to get into the building. We knew by the plans, what we had planned with the fire department to meet in the lobby of Building One, you had all the fire and police equipment parked on West Street outside of the building, which again, brought back memories of 1993. There was a picture in Time Magazine that showed it was filled up with emergency equipment and fire trucks. So we walked out to the intersection, and, people say that there was a lot of noise when Tower Two came down, to this day I don't remember any noise. All I remember looking up and catching what I thought were black objects in the air. And then the building collapsed, and just, I was stunned by it, and yelled "run," because that's the only thing you could do, because the cloud, and the debris coming down, and I looked back and the only thing that protected me, and the people I was with, was that we had the north walkway, which went from the Custom House, Building Six, over to the World Financial Center, that took a lot of the steel and the other things that were in the air, and also Building Six, which had the large hole in it, took a lot of the debris, which would have hit us as we were running.

I realized my limitations, and thank god I had about forty yards of sprint left in me, and I jumped into our command bus while officers heading north on West Street were being overcome by the debris and the white cloud, the best way to describe it was like being in a warm blizzard, a white-out, you couldn't see, it was just something, even the dust came into the command bus, the ventilation, we had closed the windows and everything, it was just, you couldn't breathe. Thank god I had my helmet on, because with the visor down, I think it protected me from taking in a lot of the material.

So now you had the buildings down, where do you go? After about ten or fifteen minutes, I remember, I was in the command bus, and we heard something knocking on it. We opened the door and there were three people, we let them in, it turned out one of them was the Chief of New York City detectives. He looked like the abominable snowman, he literally couldn't breathe, so we had to run out, I knew there was a fire unit across the

street, so we got oxygen and we gave him the oxygen. Now after the wave of the debris passed us, about ten minutes later, literally the debris on our bus was over the windshield. Thank god we were able to back it out, we backed it up a block and a half, we regrouped, started the walk back to see who we could save, that's when Building Two came down and it started all over again, the cloud, the white-out, for another ten to fifteen minutes.

We eventually got up about another two blocks back, to Manhattan Community College, just to regroup there. Just to show you what was going on at the time, what little communications we had, because when Building Two came down, we lost all communications with the Port Authority, because that's where our 800 megahertz radio trunk was. All our cell phone communications were out so that communications were bad. Rumors were running around, the White House, the Pentagon, Washington Memorial, and also there was talk of another plane coming in at one point to the World Trade Center, so you had all these wild things going around, while we were in the college trying to regroup, in an auditorium similar to this, we got word that there was a bomb threat, or a gas leak, at Stuyvesant High School, so again, everybody rushes out, goes two blocks further to a gym the college has, and we regrouped, getting all our equipment together and accounting for everybody that we did have and who responded, at that point, to get us back down to the buildings to try to save lives.

It wasn't just us, the Port Authority, again, was our headquarters, we had all our top executives, and those that were able to escape did, and they reformed up by our bus, and then they went over to Journal Square, where the police had an auxiliary command post set up. Captain Striker, now Inspector, was at headquarters, he went up and opened that, that became the command post for the Port Authority as an agency, where the decisions were made. We're very proud of what we did, because that was pay week, and just to let you know, Friday, everybody in the Port Authority got paid. As an agency we have 7500 employees, approximately 1500 of them worked in the Trade Center.

Again, what we lost, there was no communications, the only thing that was working, I was told, were the Blackberries, they were wireless, they worked throughout. That night we had reported missing from the police probably 45-50 names. The total number came down to 37, we lost 37 employees from Building One, from the Port Authority, plus there were other people, we call job shoppers, that were also lost. But of the 37 we lost, again, our dept is 1300 strong, 37 is approximately 4 percent of the department. We lost the director of public safety, we lost the chief of professional standards, who was instrumental in the recovery in 1993 at the World Trade Center, we lost the commanding officer of Kennedy Airport, we lost the captain and the executive officer from the police academy; from PATH, we lost a sergeant and 13 police officers; from the bus terminal, five police officers. Again, the total was 37, 4 percent. And that's where we had to go from.

I was designated, even that day, trying to find where a command post was going to be set up. I was calling, somebody told me around 11:30 in the morning to respond down to West and Vesey Streets, for a command center, and I said, "West and Vesey? It's on fire." But that's the kind of reports, it was chaos. And like I had been told, "Joe, it's

your job not to get drowned by the tidal wave.” That was the theme throughout the day that I kept thinking about. I went up to One Police Plaza, which New York City had set up, because NYC OEM was in Building Seven. The Mayor, they were all trying to locate, and were having trouble finding a telephone number, who to call and what was going on. But later that night, and the next couple of days, what I found out worked, being the site commander for the thing, you develop personal relationships with fire department people, NYC police, NYC OEM, and that’s where it started, and our quadrant, we hooked up because it was the closest to where the Port Authority was, was at West and Vesey, where we had two lieutenants who worked around the clock, they still do, but that’s where the communications started, and started to build up to where we had the command structure that we do today. Then eventually P.S. 89 became the OEM, and even that was unsafe, that was later moved up to Pier 92, because of it’s not being safe.

One Police Plaza stayed in operation for about two months, and we had set up the Port Authority one, and that stayed in operation for two months, and what was instrumental with the Port Authority, we have a lot of resources, we have our own construction division, which is like having the Army Corps of Engineers, anything that needed to be built down at the scene for us or OEM was built, we built our own tool cache, we also built the decontamination centers, the carpenters and the plumbers at the Port Authority. Our engineering division, a lot of plans were lost at the Trade Center, but a lot of the plans were located at the Tech Center, they responded over and worked from the first hour on recovery and what the building was. So that it was a team effort and that’s what got us through it, but we had a lot of resources and all we needed to do from Pier 92 or One Police Plaza was call over to our command post and we got the resources we needed or who we needed to talk to.

Just my personal recollections of the day, do you have any questions....

Richard Rotanz
NYC OEM

Before I get started, I'd like to say thank you to all those who responded to the World Trade Center disaster, especially working out there in the field, at the emergency operations center down at Pier 92. It's very heartwarming to see folks not only here from our old New York neighborhoods and across the river in New Jersey but from around the country, it was very heartwarming to see people from all walks of life "chip in".

Just to give you a brief idea of what the animal of OEM is all about, it started as an Office of Emergency Management for the mayor's office in 1996. Mayor Giuliani signed an executive order in April that year, and started this office to do all the planning and response coordination for all of NYC. It's broken up into various areas. One of them is the responders unit, or operations. They go out into the field, the city streets, to coordinate all the interagency actions: building collapse, large water main break, large catastrophe, such as god forbid, another plane crash like the one in the Rockaways. But in instances such as that, our respondents go out there to facilitate the incident commander, to help get the event under control and facilitate the needs of the commander, whether it's police, fire, department of health, as fast as possible.

Another segment of the OEM is called planning, which I had the nice pleasure of running. What we do in the planning division is establish what we're now in the process of doing, an all hazards plan, to umbrella all the hazards as far as natural, technological and civil hazards, under one basic plan and address each one as an annex very similar to the federal response plan. Also we have a watch command.

The EOC, the emergency operations center, is a place that we can bring all our agencies together, whether they're city, state, federal or non-governmental agencies, and help coordinate all our counter-disaster efforts and at times, plan events – this could be New Years Eve, a Macy's Day parade, a Yankees Day parade, it could also be a planned event such as watching a hurricane come up the coast, or some type of potential snowstorm, or other weather factors coming down the line. A heat wave could also be a planned event even though it's a disastrous event at times, it's observed and it's forewarned.

Also, I neglected to mention about OEM, is that I myself am hired by New York City fire department as a captain. John Odermatt, who was here speaking earlier, he's a two-star chief in the police department. We represent a hybrid of many different agencies – Department of Health, Department of Corrections, American Red Cross, and what's good about that is the planning directors, so I can pick the brains of all these experts, and say alright, we'll go in this direction, but one person raises their hand from the Department of Health, Department of Sanitation, whatever they represent, and says we're not addressing this issue, and this strengthens our planning and also strengthens our response down the line in the case of the event.

This facility also provides an environment that addresses the six functions of what an emergency operation center should be. I refer to a professor down at a disaster research

center at Delaware University, E.L. Quarantelli A lot of his writings show up in our literature at FEMA and in books, throughout many colleges in the country. And I'm going to go over those six functions momentarily.

This used to be our home – right now, we used to be the Office of Emergency Management, now we're a charter agency. We're somewhat homeless at the same time, in our boxes and our coveralls...

But to give you an idea of what it used to look like, on the lower left here, was our watch command, and the watch command's function, which I'll address now, is, they're the eyes and ears of what's going on out there in city streets. They have their finger on the pulse, fire, police, EMS, DOT, Port Authority, the airports. They're listening, monitoring as a sentinel, to find out if anything is coming down the line. We also monitor Con Edison on their feeder breakdowns and power outages, so we get a sense of where any particular hazard or threat is going by visualizing and listening to our frequencies.

Above, the two top photographs show what our facility used to look like. It used to facilitate 70 to 75 different agencies from all different walks of life, whether it be military, federal government, state government, or local.

On that fateful day, when we lost a lot of our friends and loved ones, we were at work presenting a case for the next day's operations at Pier 92. On September 12 we were going to be performing a major time study for biological hazards drill on how we were going to prophylax and medicate 8 million people in New York City, if god forbid, everyone was exposed to anthrax. So at that particular point, where the arrow was pointed at 7 World Trade Center, we were facing the direction of the first jet that was approaching Tower One, and when Tower One was struck by the first plane, myself and two other fellows went down to the Fire Safety Director's office on the mezzanine level of Tower One to start and initiate the interagency unified field command, and when the fire department showed up with Chief Pete Hayden, police, and field response executives, I myself then went back to World Trade Center Seven, and while walking through the pavilion of the World Trade Center, Tower Two got hit and I put my Keds sneakers on and headed back to World Trade Center Seven.

Once I was back into the EOC operations we did a threat analysis and it didn't take long, especially when the CIA and Secret Service and FBI folks were up there waiting for me saying the Pentagon's been hit, there's one ditched in Pennsylvania, and I think there's one or two birds missing in the air that we can't find right now. With that, we evacuated Building Seven and made sure that entire building was evacuated, and sent all of the folks up north, toward Canal Street.

Fortunately we're an agency that did not lose anyone, though I'm a fire captain and I lost many friends, but as far as OEM is concerned, I had some minor injuries - a few folks went to the hospitals for minor cuts and bruises, I myself with a concussion and a little hard of hearing once in a while, but we're all here. Having evacuated everyone from Building Seven, I went back to Tower One to assist with our director and first deputy

director with operations and at that time, we realized they were evacuated up West Street. Myself and another OEM planner, were trapped during the first collapse when Tower Two came down. After we dug ourselves out, we went back to the Tower Seven, just a little anecdote, to make sure everyone was evacuated, and Tower One came down on top of us. So, count our blessings, we were banged up, he had a broken wrist and like I said before, I got a concussion, we worked our way out of the dust and debris, going toward West and Vesey Street. Now, you have to understand, I come from a large family, I have seven sons, and two of them are trying to be New York City firemen, and working back towards the command center, I had passed one of our excellent chiefs, Chief Visconti, and Chief Roche and a few other fellas, as I'm walking around dazed, I had two kids sit me down on the back of a curb, pour some water on my head, they smack me around, and said "Dad?" and I saw FDNY, so my two kids found me there, got me up, gave me a hug, and said, "You gonna be home for dinner?" So with that I got myself oriented, and they called mom, and besides the screaming, "where are you" and "where's dad," they said I was fine, I was playing around with the firemen in the dust.

After the collapse here, if you could see the remains of Seven World Trade Center, I believe it was about six hours later, that too was destroyed. We worked our way up to One Police Plaza, got ourselves oriented, and momentarily went up to the police academy for about 2-3 days to set up operations there, and in the meantime find a home for us to operate our EOC.

To start off with the six functions that have been set out by Quarantelli on emergency operations centers, the first part here is to gather all the entities, coordinate all the government representatives, and focus on two types of demands. We have agent and response generated demands. What we try to do is address these, facilitate these out into the field, facilitate them to the fire department, the police department, whatever the incident commander's in charge.

What is an agent-generated demand, and what is a response-generated demand. The agent-generated demand occurs during a particular event – if we have a hurricane, or mass flooding, that demand is we're looking for sand and sandbags. If we have an event where there's a biological attack or an epidemic, we're now looking for prophylactic medication or curable medication. That's an agent-generated demand. The response-generated demand is such that it facilitates the response. The response-generated demand here at the World Trade Center attack was enormous. We need masks, we need body bags, we need gloves, we need respirators, on and on the list was immense. This was addressed by our field responders also our forward command post unit, the mobile bus we had on site at West Street, and we tried to grasp for the first few hours as to what was needed to facilitate the rescuers and also other responding agencies.

One of our other functions besides coordinating other agencies is to make sure that everybody plays nice, everybody's lovey-dovey, everybody's patting each other on the back, there's nobody arguing who's responsible for what issue, who wants to be doing this, you try to get everybody together and say all right, we're going to be doing these particular functions and process at this particular time and everybody agrees with it.

We also deal with timely mobilization problems. With all coordination, what we're trying to get down to, is respond efficiently and respond timely. You don't want to have ten people trying to do CPR on one person, you want to have it sequentially. Who is going to respond and when.

Another point here is an emergency operations center doesn't always focus on one event also. During the September 11th crisis, up until December 21st, we were dealing with an earthquake of 2.6, measured on the Richter scale in Queens, we were dealing with flight 587, we were also dealing with numerous anthrax letters, a threat from Hurricane Michelle coming up the coast, god forbid, god bless her, she went out east, and influenza was rising and also labor unrest with the bus strikes that were going on in Queens.

The coordination point was originally set on West Street, as I mentioned before, with the mobile bus, it was just north of the attack site, and it was merely set up to conduct field ops, get a feel of what was really needed. We also were initially doing an OEM role call who was around, who can respond back by Nextels, by pagers, by radios, by flares. And also to muster up any and all available OEM staff to get to the site.

Here is an old floor diagram of World Trade Center Seven. If you look up at the top center, that was where the podium is. If you can envision the stage here as a podium where the podium manager would stand up there and have assisting representatives from OEM, the podium here would conduct all operations throughout the EOC. To assist the podium manager you have representatives from FEMA, from SEMO, we have a logistics team, we have a recovery team, we have infrastructure, people that look after bridges and tunnels, power, and water, steam, we also have public safety, one person who is always monitoring the operations of police, fire and EMS.

Again the watch command, we had our own watch command that was built later on at Pier 92, but that wasn't facilitated for about a month into operations.

Normally before September, we had established two basic levels of activation. We had the limited, where key EOC representatives would come into a facility. What does that mean? During the New Year's Eve activation, which we had for twelve hours, we just had the necessary agencies to be there on the scene, and what are those -- Con Edison, Verizon, fire, police, PD intel, medical, human services, we can call in the Board of Education. Why? they facilitate shelters if need be, and there's about a handful of others.

During a full blown activation, like September 11th, normally we would have 70-75 agencies but as it has been, by September 20th we had 140 different agencies. What were the additional ones? You had Battery Park City representatives, you had business representatives, you had people there for mental health to be facilitators, numerous different clergies, FAA, and other military representatives that were not normally showing up to our previous activations.

Here is a picture of the podium at Pier 92. As I mentioned before, we have various different personnel up there. The government folks from SEMO and FEMA, infrastructure and recovery, people with special needs, those are people who are handicapped, they're at home or bed-ridden they can't get around on their own. We had numerous access problems at the World Trade Center site, or the area south of Canal Street, then 14th street as it fluctuated, so we addressed those issues with people with special needs.

At one time during our activation, I think the highest amount of people, the population at the pier was in excess of 1200 folks. Besides the 130-some-odd agency representatives, we had our own staffing, we had security people, American Red Cross was putting the ton on everybody's belt line – during the first week after the activation I lost eight pounds, since then I put on another 25, and now my wife is forcing me on a diet. But here we had people that were showing up at the facility not sure what an emergency operations center was. We had some old-timers from previous activations who were there to help us, but normally thru a partial or full activation we have 50 to 70; now we have 130 representatives. So we were inundated by different questions. Besides the questions that were going to the podium manager and over to the other people onstage here, we would have a queuing effect of about 30-40 people waiting to ask us questions about what to do or how do I ask for this, or what phone number do I have, or how do I log on? One of the folks gave me a clicker just to count how many times I was asked a question between 6 in the morning and 10 at night, and I passed 1700 at 2 in the afternoon.

But just on a lighter note, during the first month besides being responsible for running the operations center, I would go to and from early morning operations at the Duane Street Firehouse... this is where we'd do face-to-face meetings with Chief Blaich, Chief Cruthers, do action plans, whatever the fire dept needed at the time, we would facilitate that. I had this gentleman, a 59 year old Major, Will Lockridge, it was unbelievable, I'm running through the rubble, this fella's pushing 60 years old and keeping up with me, not that I'm an athlete, but during the height of the chaos, he asked me to be his best man, he was getting married the next day. I go, "where are you getting married?" and he goes, "Can I get married here on the podium?" and, sure. With this, Mayor Giuliani's walking down the aisle in front of the podium, and I expressed a little surprise, light-heartedness amongst all the chaos and all the depression. He goes, "congratulations, that's great," and I informed him, "I'm going to be his best man" and he goes, "that's wonderful," and I'm looking at the mayor, I go, "he's looking for someone to preside over the wedding." So we had a wedding, presided over by the mayor, at the podium, as you can see where this woman is standing here, two hundred glasses of champagne, a red carpet, and a horse and buggy ride, and a nice little free steak dinner afterwards. It was nice!

The Emergency Operations Center is broken down into groups, as I mentioned before, and what we try to do is to group the agencies into common goals, common functions. As you see here, utilities, speaks for itself: water, power, electric and other types of fuels. Infrastructure: that's the sub-surfaces and structures of our railways, subways, streets, bridges, tunnels, airports. We have our public safety, transportations, Joint Information,

very important for any emergency workers out in the audience, Joint Information was about 20-30 different representatives from all different press offices of the different agencies. The intent here is that if there's going to be an announcement made by the mayor, or information is going to be put out to the public, everybody should be on the same page. You try to avoid rumors, you try to avoid misinformation that could adversely affect the operations down at the site, or sites, that we had at one time in November, combating the flames out in the Rockaways, listening out for an earthquake in Queens, dealing with the World Trade Center site, and monitoring Michelle coming up the coast.

Here's a shot of Pier 92. It housed 100 agency reps but 130 were representatives themselves. Here we have federal, city, private and non-profit organizations that we basically operated side by side. FEMA, SEMO and the city and non-governmental agencies. Over 300 reps per shift were working within the EOC and with support services and other personnel there, at one time we had in excess of 1000 people.

I personally cannot go overboard expressing my gratitude to the folks from New York State Emergency Management, especially those folks from FEMA. We're only a small agency of 60 people in OEM, 25 of those are responders. Another 20 are support staff, and I only have myself and about 12 people from planning that are responsible for running the Emergency Operations Center. Now it's 24-7 and my folks that I had to deal with special needs, deal with health, deal with logistics, I had to throw them away from the podium and address these issues in numerous action plans. We were backed by a lot of staff from state emergency management and also FEMA. It's really warming to see these folks come in there and sit in the chairs like they'd been working there for three or four years, people that were emergency managers from around the country.

New Yorkers, you tend to start joking about these people from the south, the west, and their actions. Two gentlemen walked onto the podium, one fellow was about 6'5", Joe Allbaugh, I think he works at FEMA as a director, the other guy, Bob Frey, from Montana, they walked onto the podium, and Joe Allbaugh introduces me to this fellow who was 6'8" from Montana, he goes, "this is Bob Frey, Rich, he's going to help you out with the podium." "Hi, Rich," (with drawl), and Bob Frey sits down at the podium, he goes, "I'll take care of things for you, Rich." Meanwhile it's one in the morning, and I'm shot, well, Bob Frey, god bless him, the next time he comes back here I'm going to buy him a couple of steak dinners, because the man was phenomenal. He reorganized the podium because everybody was dropping like flies. Created databases for us, had phenomenal ideas, plus he autographed a book... great guy.

Pardon my engineering drawings here, I tried a little AutoCAD... The EOC as it existed back in September/October 2001... The blank white square in the middle is our podium, just to go from the clock on the picture here, the military representatives are Naval Militia, the Marines, the Army National Guard, press folks, utilities infrastructure, logistics, law enforcement, you had people from the State, Department of Conservation, FBI, intel, you had people from some agencies, they didn't tell me who they were! Fire, EMS, they were phenomenal, along with Human Services, they engulfed a lot of different

voluntary agencies, health and medical, these were our PHS folks, morgue, people who run the Department of Health in NYC, and New York State.

As you can see, everybody had common goals and functions, “kumbayaahed,” sat and huddled on different plans and actions during this event. Mapping and GIS – as the Chief displayed in his powerpoint was phenomenal. Where was the trade center, where are things now. I think I can state that we had the first emergency response mapping unit. We took an old van, put in plotters, databases, a couple of database managers, some digital cameras and a satellite dish, and went down to Flight 587, set up a mapping unit and gave anybody whatever maps they needed, of the Rockaways, and also flyover pictures, real time. It was very rewarding.

You can also see to the left of Mapping and Health... Everybody’s here in this room, how are we going to communicate with each other? About, I need 1500 body bags, I need a crane that can pick up 3000 tons. OEM had their own software, it was called NYCETrack. Some of you have visited some other emergency management agencies on the west coast, they use a software called ETeam. Now I’m not advertising ETeam, but it’s the software program that we used. Now what this does, it facilitates information to and fro throughout the whole operations center. Plus it’s web based, meaning that we had folks in Staten Island, folks in different agencies around the east coast that were tuned in and logged in to this web site, ETeam. If I needed a certain amount of a material, I would put the request in. The request would be seen by everyone, especially the folks in the logistics team in the podium.

Let me give you a little example. Someone needed 40 steel plates. Well, everybody who had 40 steel plates, “where do you want them, how do you get them there.” One fellow came up to me with two very unusual requests. One request was from an agency that wanted 15 video cameras, 14 tvs, all this equipment, that explosive, all that, signed by another agency. The other agency came to me and indicated that they didn’t ask for this. We look at the back of the page, it gives you the code. We find out who’s making these requests. So we have some style of electronic security to prevent any wrongdoing, mistakes, what have you. The ETeam facilitators kept an ongoing record of the requests that were made, the requests that were denied, the requests that were filled, and the requests that could not be done. What this all turns into is a term used in the field of social sciences and emergency management, “Emergent Resource Management.” You’re merging all the resources into one entity, the Emergency Operations Center, and you’re managing these resources as efficiently as possible, to give the fire chief, the police chief, the Department of Health nurse, whatever that person needs, as expeditiously as possible.

This shows you one little example of a group, Human Services. These were some of the agencies that were there, you have World Church Services, you had Catholic Charities, New York Cares, American Red Cross, and on and on. What’s important about this is that during our incident action plans, with the fire department, and also back at the EOC, we gave a certain agency the lead. As far as feeding people at the World Trade Center site, the American Red Cross was the lead agency. A lot of people would ask why, why

don't you just feed these fellows that are down there, working hard and vigorously, and they're just starving, they need their energy. But we had to control the feeding patterns at the World Trade Center site because when the fellows were done with their work tour, or they needed a break, they would leave the site, clean up, go someplace that was regulated, and eat their refreshments and go home, or come back. It fluctuated from time to time. We didn't want anybody backing up a tractor-trailer with a bunch of waitresses holding steaks and burgers and shrimp cocktails and walking into the site, everyone drops their tools and looks, and they want to have some burgers, we tried to keep the health hazards down as much as possible. So you want to have a lead agency from each one of these groups.

The EOC is supposed to act as a platform for policy decisions. We used to have a mayor's conference room at the World Trade Center facility, and we also had the ability for teleconferencing and phone conferencing. Here, we want to develop incident action plans at the EOC or offsite, like we did at the Duane Street firehouse. Here, at the EOC, as far as policy decisions, every 12 hours for the first two months, and then every 24 hours, and now it's every 48 hours, we developed situation reports. What's going on? We facilitate from all our representatives in the EOC, "what's going on in your agency?" We'll edit what's needed to be said and the situation report, very similar to what the chief was showing you, an incident action plan, we give about a 30-page report to the executive staff at OEM, and they send it over to the police, fire and other important agencies.

This is a shot of our old mayor's conference room in World Trade Center Seven. We set up on a mezzanine level of Pier 92, very similar to this, not as luxurious, not with all the cameras, and the smoke and mirror effects, but that's what we did at Pier 92, and this is our old facility at World Trade Center Seven.

Just to elaborate a little further on our instant action plannings, we're now over to health and medical policies, we're going into environmental testing, work and worker health safety policies and plans, and we coordinated operations that were necessary to try to make it as safe as possible. By the end of October, we registered over 10,000 injuries, some from a splinter to something in the eye to a few fellows had third degree burns and minor fractures.

Again, we had on the business continuity side, which was very prevalent and it was a very pressing issue for the mayor's office, the governor's office, the president's office, on economic recovery to lower Manhattan. Incident action plans were devised on how fast folks could get back into the site itself. Steady efforts were made to reopen closed areas at the site. Zone boundaries were drawn and adjusted to the operational concerns, security concerns, and safety and environmental health.

The third function is operations management. Again, it's a constellation of agent and response generated demands. They vary from agency to agency. One of my logistics folks, that was substituting from Rhode Island, was asking me why was this particular agency asking for 1500 nail files, emery boards, camphor, Vaseline, and latex hand

gloves. I asked where this particular request was coming from and they were requested in to this equipment to go down to the Staten Island landfill. I tried to explain the dynamics, that these folks are down there digging through the piles and trying to keep the debris of human remains and other objects from underneath their fingernails. So that was an agent generated demand, not a response. And also, as the event proceeds, or the timeline lengthens, the change demands either diminishes or they alter, as we indicated before, with the request from the Staten Island landfill.

Function four, to situate with information collection. Damage assessment, record keeping, ongoing security analysis, we tend to forget, some folks do, that this is the largest crime scene ever in the United States, as far as geographical scenes are concerned. We have to gather it, we have to analyze it, we have to disseminate it to the proper people who should be getting it. A lot of this information was not made be public and should not be made public, but eventually it got into the press, that there was four million dollars worth of gold in certain parts of the World Trade Center, there were vaults left open with very important documents, and later, I think, we just found out there was a recent drug bust because of certain evidence.

Again, this is how information is disseminated, through different levels of security, through ETeam.

Public information and public information officer – very important. The mass media – the USD should be the point of contact as to what’s going on in that particular event, whether it’s the World Trade Center, it could be a New Year’s Eve event, and the emphasis here is to get out accurate information to the press. The press, a lot of people say the press is this, the press is that, I think the press is great... if you use the press, not use them, but work with them, they’ll facilitate what information has to be out there. They may be a little glamorous, they may play it up a bit but if you give them the right information and have them buy into your operations, they’ll be a great ally to you.

The public information officer, he may be at a location other than the EOC, but in this particular case it was true. Our public information officer, Deputy Director Frank McCarten? was at the EOC many, many times but he was also at the site to control cameras and other video shots of the site because it was still a crime scene.

Just to give you an example of how important the press is, this is during the beginning phases of the lockdown of lower Manhattan. We have another form of outreach program through the press, called EMOLS, Emergency Management Online System, through our website. This was presented on EMOLS.

It shows you how the site itself shrunk? following shutting down streets.

(next, next, next)

It shows you how people are now being informed they can go back to their businesses, they can go back to their homes. There are going to be trains open, there’s going to be

buses going north and south on Church Street. The press will inform the public, you want to inform them as best as possible.

Hosting visitors – during the first few weeks, it seemed to be very annoying, you're thinking about your loved ones and fellows that you've worked with for many years that are still trapped there at the World Trade Center site. But as an emergency operations center, it is very important, we, too, as New Yorkers, go out to various different sites around the world - Armenia for the earthquake, the bombing in Oklahoma, other earthquakes on the west coast, we go there and offer our assistance but we also study what's going on in their particular operations, so we learn good points and bad points from their operations. So we have to be a host at the same time. We've had the president of the United States come up here down at the site. We've had the governors, sheikhs, prime ministers from around the world, coming into the emergency operations center. For the first 8 or 9 weeks, I probably saw more dignitaries and celebrities than I'll ever see in a lifetime. One o'clock in the morning, I'm sitting here with my head over here, I'm holding a cup of coffee, some guy's giving me a hug and I'm looking at him, who are you? "You know, Pussy, from The Sopranos," and I'm like, what are you doing here? I thought you were in the water. And right behind me, standing there, is Bobby Valentine... hey Bob... ah, you guys lost. He took it well. But they were there to help. Some of these folks, I didn't see one of the celebrities or dignitaries go around with photo ops. I'm being sincere with that, they would show up and say, "Is there anything we can do?" And when you have a guy with hands like this, he talks with an accent, Arnold Schwarzenegger, shaking your hand, you know, he was very very good.

Thank you very much, folks.

Marianne Jackson
FEMA

Good afternoon... I'm not funny like Rich, that's for sure.

I want to give you a perspective, an overview, of the federal role in supporting New York State and New York City.

We know what happened... this is a description of the incident.

I'm going to talk briefly about response operations. Our first responders here have given you some of the details of their heroic and compassionate response to the incident at the World Trade Center.

Richard painted a very clear picture of what the mayor did, and what NYC OEM did, and what happened to their beautiful command center.

Governor Pataki immediately declared a state of emergency and in Albany, the state EOC was activated, and of course state troopers, and highway personnel, and 500 national guardsmen were deployed to Manhattan.

More details of the NYS response... I think it's important to note that establishing staging areas was critical, and this is some of the planning we had done for hurricanes and other hazards, so that we had pre-identified sites where the state could move assets to. And the state also did an excellent job as far as their donations management, because we certainly did not want billions, or millions, of tons of donated goods flowing into NYC, and the state did a good job of keeping the donations under control.

That day, President Bush signed a presidential disaster declaration, and he directed Joe Allbaugh, who is the Director of FEMA, appointed by President Bush, he was directed to activate the president's federal response plan. For those of you who don't know, the federal response plan is a concept of operations, whereby resources at the federal level can be quickly made available to the impacted community. We've used this on hurricanes, we've used this on earthquakes, and we used it in Oklahoma City. The plan works, and I'll talk a little bit more about it in a few minutes.

Region 2 is located at 26 Federal Plaza, FEMA has 10 regions. 26 Federal Plaza, for those of you who don't know, is in lower Manhattan, it's about 8 short blocks from the World Trade Center site. Some of the folks were already in the office in Region 2. What the region did was they deployed their emergency response team to various locations, but most of the response team went to a continuity of operations site, predesignated, and equipped in Bayonne, New Jersey. Also, at the same time, FEMA headquarters activated their emergency support team at FEMA headquarters in Washington.

Our colleagues in Region 1 in New York activated their emergency operation center, we call them regional operation centers, it's the same thing, to support Region 2 during the move to the alternate location, and they were in close coordination with the folks in hq.

The federal response involves 11 functions, and it's all functional, all this planning and response stuff has to be functional. There are 11 emergency support functions and those were activated so that representatives from those agencies showed up in Washington, showed up in Region 1, and showed up at the backup facility in New Jersey.

Per our nation's disaster law, the Stafford Act, the governor did request federal assistance, I don't know if it was in writing or verbal. The president signed a major disaster declaration with no cost share for the major programs. Ted Monette was named the federal coordinating officer, and he was in Washington that day and I happened to be there also, on business from a flooding disaster in southwest Virginia. In the early days, we approved almost \$400 million dollars, like in advance payments, to the city.

On any presidential disaster declaration, all the designations are done by counties, and of course, the boroughs equal the counties. We also added other counties on to make sure that the people who lived in surrounding areas could apply for assistance, and also to make sure that responders from other parts of the state would eventually be reimbursed for the costs they had in responding to support the city.

This will give you some idea of the assets that were brought in. We have a standard pack of assets that are automatically, or quickly, deployed, in addition to what we know the city and the state need for a particular incident. We activated eight urban search-and-rescue teams, and those are the firefighting units from across the country that are trained and equipped and ready to deploy. And of course New York City had, has, an urban rescue team, but a number of members perished in the World Trade Center, particularly their leader, Ray Downing.

We also brought in from HHS these D-Mort teams, which are mobile morgue units, and we are actually still funding one, working with the medical examiner's office; four disaster medical assistance teams, which are like MASH hospitals, and they were down at the site, supporting the city; a management support team, which are the folks that help the city purchase supplies, build and manage the caches that we had down there; a morgue unit; and a veterinary medical team, and those came in very, very quickly.

FEMA has capability called MERS, Mobile Emergency Response Support. We have good standalone transportable communications capability, so we had people driving these units from all over, so they were able to get in very, very quickly. And other federal agencies such as the Corps of Engineers have their own transportable communications vans, and those became useful as well.

Our initial priorities were to bring lifesaving support to New York City; establish the mobilization centers, which were outside New York City, where most of them were able to fly in assets; assess the damage infrastructure and listening to the two chiefs and Rich,

you realize the uncertainty about what the infrastructure damage was, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. I think we really weren't quite sure of what we had, except it was bad. And then fourthly, assess the debris management requirements. And these are priorities that were agreed to and worked with the city and with the state.

FEMA relocated from New Jersey to the Javits Center, and then to Pier 90 on the west side of Manhattan, which was one pier down from New York City OEM. And we do explain that New York City established their EOC at Pier 92. At the height of the disaster we had federal and state people, over 6700 people, those are the ones we counted. I want to credit staff who came from all over the country to assist us here. We had one person who drove overnight from Florida, another person who drove from Chicago, another person who drove from St. Louis, you know, the airlines weren't operating, and I think it's a testament to their dedication and their commitment.

The federal response plan: let me run down the federal agencies to give you a sense. Some of them are represented here. ESF1 transportation: this is the lead agency under the federal response plan and they can call in other federal agencies for support. They coordinated the transport of the urban search-and-rescue teams; they obtained overflight clearances; they obtained transport of emergency officials, and supplies, and there were waivers that were necessary and they did an outstanding job. I don't know where you're seated, Dave, but thank you very much.

ESF2 is national communications system and they coordinated our request for telecommunications service priorities, which is something that is set up ahead of time with communications units to determine priorities that are needed in an instance like this.

ESF3 is public works and engineering, the lead is the US Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA has worked with the Corps on many, many disasters. On this disaster they're monitoring the debris operations out at the Staten Island landfill and assisting the city at the site. The landfill operation is a mammoth operation, and the Corps is working closely with the New York City police department and the FBI, and I know that C-SPAN has covered it recently. It's a mammoth operation and it's very, very efficient. They also provided technical assistance on damage assessment and structural safety issues. They're engineers, they're good. They assisted in the dredging operations, we dredged a pier in lower Manhattan to make it easier to barge the debris from the site out to the landfill. And they assisted Con Ed in power restoration.

ESF4 is firefighting. The lead is the US Forest Service. The chief explains their experience is fighting fires, but they know how to buy things, they know how to organize, they know how to move quickly, and they supported New York City down at the site. They brought in this incident management team, and they also supported the DMAT team and the USAR teams, and they got the supply caches, and they helped with warehouse operations.

ESF5 is information and planning, which FEMA leads, and we do the reports for Washington, and the strategic planning, and the continuity of government planning,

because as we were taking up this challenge, we realized that there were other threats out there that we had to prepare for, that eventuality.

ESF5 is also home to the geographical information system experts, and they coordinated with the city and the state, and we brought in some extra resources to help chart our path down at the site.

ESF6 is mass care, the lead agency there is the Red Cross, and I think we all know the great job that the voluntary agencies did, providing meals, and it's not just the Red Cross, it was a lot of other agencies. There wasn't, on this disaster, a need, as you see, for example, on a hurricane, for a lot of shelters. There were just a couple of shelters open in the early days. They didn't stay open too long.

ESF7 is resource support. This is really buying things that people need, and these are some of the things that we bought, and they contracted for, and the way it works is the city identified a need for something, and they passed it through the state, it would be down at the site or at Pier 92, and we would go out and buy it. We bought the stuff or brought it in from wherever as quickly as we could.

And remember, we had the support of the team in Washington that could expedite things for us if we were having difficulty in getting anything from Pier 90.

ESF8, health and medical, that's public health service, they're one of the key emergency support functions. They brought in a pharmaceutical stockpile, they provided the D-morts, the veterans' team. They also bring in nurses, and they provided nurses to the disaster field office at Pier 92, and they provided nurses to the disaster assistance service center.

ESF9 is urban search-and-rescue, these are the teams, or the task forces, that we brought in to help the city. These are the pre-identified, trained, equipped fire departments that we brought in from other parts of the country to help the city.

ESF10, another big player in this event, EPA, they continue to do a lot of air sampling down there. They're running the wash station for the trucks, and they're providing guidance to the New York City Fire Department on hazardous materials disposal, which has gone very smoothly, I think we would all agree, as far as the hazmat disposal.

ESF11, food – the Department of Agriculture. On this disaster, their primary mission was to provide disaster food stamps to people who lived in the area. There wasn't a shortage of food, because of the nature of this incident, so we didn't have to the Department of Agriculture for foodstuffs. We were able to purchase the food that was needed.

ESF12, the last one, is the Department of Energy. They provided a lot of technical assistance and guidance to Con Ed and industry officials, and they were very instrumental in helping us work together to restore the financial district power so they could operate.

An important player on disasters is the Department of Defense. We all know that the Department of Defense has a tremendous number of assets, and when the president declares a major disaster, the Department of Defense, oddly enough, works for the federal coordinating officer to provide any support that is needed from the DOD side that we can't come up with from the city or the state, or from the civilian federal agencies. The Department of Defense coordinator was outstanding, he was from Fort Drum in upstate New York. They did some training, they brought in small robots that were able to navigate areas, tunnels in the World Trade Center in the initial days, they had lots of technology that they were able to bring in, and of course they brought in the US Navy hospital ship, Comfort, which was a comfort, and we kind of hated to see it leave when it sailed out of the harbor.

This was a tragically unique disaster and our plans and procedures were modified to meet the challenges of this incident.

We created a fire support branch, which was to provide support to the New York City Fire Department down at the site. Mike Byrne, who was another speaker today, who was with FEMA at the time, and is now with Homeland Security, Mike, I hope you'll be able to, in your remarks, talk a little bit about the fire support branch.

A component of that is a forward coordinating team, recognizing the horrible loss that the fire department sustained as a result of this, we brought in resources and trained personnel to support the city in dealing with the incident down there. We brought in people from all over the country who were able to help.

Another adjustment we had to make was logistics. We do have to talk about logistics, I think you all realize that, because of the size of this disaster, and the requirements particularly for the forward coordinating team, we realized that we needed an internal logistics and also an external logistics, because our internal logistics was getting us set up so that we could operate out of Pier 90, but the external logistics was to make sure that we were supporting the people at the scene, who were dealing with the incident.

This, we have, I noticed outside in the display boxes, it's a statement from one of the urban search-and-rescue teams that was sent to us, it was carried in one of the newspapers. It's very moving, and I think it was appreciated.

I'm going to talk briefly about recovery assistance. I think we all know that there was a tremendous outpouring of generosity on the part of many people to the voluntary agencies and to special funds. The recovery assistance is complicated by that generosity and also by the fact that there are people out there with a lot of different needs, including people who have long term economic needs.

The delivery of assistance to individuals, on this disaster, has been coordinated by FEMA in coordination with other agencies, including the voluntary agencies. To register for assistance, people can call this FEMA 800 number, and if necessary, they're referred to

other agencies. One of the agencies that kicked in here was the Department of Justice Crime Victims Board, not the Victims Compensation Act, but the Crime Victims Board, because under our nation's laws, if there's a terrorist act, and this obviously was, certain programs kick in which are to aid the families of the people who suffered or people who were injured, because they are truly crime victims. Those benefits are administered by the state, by the Crime Victims Board. So we work that coordination out up front.

Disaster housing is a big one for us on hurricanes, here we found that what we were doing was helping people who had to move out of their apartments in lower Manhattan. It's not just Battery Park City, but a lot of those buildings down there are lofts that were converted to residences. So we helped people pay their hotel bills, get another apartment for as long as they couldn't get back to their house, some of them we'll continue to help them because they still can't get into their house. We gave them money to clean up their apartments, if their insurance wasn't going to cover it, so there are a number of things we did with people and their housing.

Under that disaster housing program is something called Mortgage Assistance. It's really mortgage and rental assistance, and this is a big program. It's for people who, as a direct result of the attacks on the World Trade Center, are having an economic problem and cannot pay their mortgage or rent. We work with them and depending on how long it will take them to get back on their feet, we'll pay their mortgage and rent for up to 18 months. So that's an important program, and considering the prices for mortgages and rents in New York City, it's a significant amount of money.

There's another program called the Individual and Family Grant program, which the state administers, where we were helping people with a lot of needs. The Small Business Administration, as you probably know, has disaster loans for homeowners and renters. And then there's also a Disaster Unemployment program, which dovetails with the regular unemployment program.

We set up a disaster service center. First it was at Pier 94, where the family assistance center was, and now it's been moved to 51 Chambers, in lower Manhattan. We also set up another one at Worth Street, also in lower Manhattan, where the disaster field office has been moved to. That's basically a one-stop center for people who were victims of the World Trade Center, and we're emphasizing that most of the assistance that people are going there for, they probably can get it by phone. But some people prefer to talk to someone face to face, and we understand that entirely.

Crisis counseling is another program that FEMA funds, it's one hundred percent, it's to set up a network of counseling services for people who need it in New York City and throughout the counties and in adjacent states. You may have seen the project, it's called Project Liberty, and they've taken out ads in the newspapers, and in New York City it's the Lifenet number, is the number that they're funding, and they've brought in trained workers, and given them more training, they're there to help people because we know from other disasters and from what Quarantelli has told us, is that the psychological effects of disasters can be very severe. You see an increase in everything: substance

abuse, child abuse, whatever problems that people have are exacerbated, plus they're going to get new problems.

Voluntary agencies, I mentioned them before. There are so many of them, they deserve so much credit for their generosity and their commitment.

The other side, our other big program is called public assistance, which is aid to government, the name is somewhat misleading. For this disaster, basically in public assistance we pay for emergency work and permanent work. Emergency work, debris operations falls under emergency work, so basically we're paying for the cost, we will pay for the cost to remove the debris from the World Trade Center site, and also the cost to run the Staten Island recovery operation. And we're supporting the City on that and when there's insurance coverage that would be deducted, but that is something the federal government will pay for one hundred percent.

We're also paying the City overtime for emergency workers, replacement of emergency equipment and materials, so there are a whole host of eligible items that would be paid for under the Public Assistance program. We've already reimbursed the City for the cost of 52 new fire trucks.

Public Assistance will also take care of the permanent restoration and we know, if you read the papers, that that's going to be complicated in New York City because of the leases, because of how much insurance the lessor of the World Trade Center has, also what our intentions are as a city for rebuilding. But the permanent restoration are things that will be paid for under the Public Assistance program, again, not duplicating what insurance costs there would be. The City is working on a transportation plan, it's moving along very fast. There's hope that the One and Nine trains which went through the World Trade Center, that there's going to be temporary service restored in November, they're saying. Plus the whole challenge of what we're going to do with the World Trade Center site, and the PATH, and the other transportation capabilities that were disrupted there.

Under the Public Assistance program, we've tried to streamline the process as much as we can, the technical assistance contractors are people who are working with FEMA and they're assigned to city agencies and state agencies to help them determine what their eligible costs are. We also are streamlining the process as much as we can, we're using something, the last one, called Incremental Cost Approach, which means that we don't expect you to give us all your records for overtime, you know, let's just come up with a reasonable average and do it that way.

The next slide, we have mitigation, which is another effort to see how we can help the City and the State take steps to strengthen New York as a community, from similar future events.

And finally, this is my final slide, we have long term recovery, and the FEMA speaker, I believe, later today, Brad Gair, is going to talk a little bit about recovery, which is very, very complex.

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FEMA Region II
John Jay College (CUNY)

So thank you very much, I hope I've given you an overview.